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Notes
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY-BEDs OF NAVIGABLE WATERS-
SUSCEPTIBILITY OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
The Humble Oil and Refining Company provoked a concursus
proceeding' to determine the rightful claimants of the proceeds
of oil production secured from Duck Lake, under dual leases from
the state and Salt Domes, Incorporated. For the purpose of a
judgment on the face of the pleadings, it was stipulated that Duck
Lake was navigable in 1812 and is navigable now. The 1hke, not
especially described in the patent under which Salt Domes
claimed title, was located within a large tract of swamp land
derived from the Swamp Land Grants of 1849 and 1850. 2 The
state claimed ownership by virtue of its having acquired title
upon admission to the Union in 1812,' and denied it had ever
validly disposed of the property. Salt Domes, Incorporated,
asserted that the transfer of the entire tract by the state to the
Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, as well as the levee board's
alienation in 1901 to Salt Dome's author in title, was authorized
by statute.4 It then urged the prescription of six years provided
by Act 62 of 1912 in which the state was required to bring all
suits to vacate and annul patents within six years of the date of
the patent or the date of the act. Held, the state, under Act 62 of
1912, was forever barred from attacking the validity of the Salt
Domes title to the bed of a lake conceded to have been navigable
in 1812 and now. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. State Mineral
Board, 223 La. 47, 64 So. 2d 839 (1953).
The state's position was that the purported transfer which
described the tract according to section, township and range, but
without mention of the lake either as having been included or
excepted, was wholly without statutory authority and therefore
absolutely null. Salt Domes asserted that the transfer was author-
ized by Act 97 of 1890, in which the state conveyed to the Atacha-
1. La. R.S. 1950, 13:4811-4817.
2. Act of March 2, 1849, c. 87, 9 Stat. 352; Act of Sept. 28, 1850, c. 84, 9
Stat. 519.
3. State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405 (1912); State
v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916); State v. Capdeville, 146 La.
94, 83 So. 421 (1919); State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635, 101 So. 4 (1924).
4. La. Act 97 of 1890.
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falaya Basin Levee District certain "vacant lands," and that there
was no constitutional prohibition against this alienation at the
time of the transfer or in 1912 when the Legislature enacted the
six-year peremption statute to settle titles derived from patents
and transfers by the state. Pretermitting all questions of the
merits of title and stating that it was of no importance whether
the "deed of the public officers was beyond the powers vested.",,
by the statute conveying lands to the levee district, the court
ruled as follows:
"The transfer being an accomplished fact and the property
having been acquired by private transferees, the state was
accorded six years to contest the matter. Failure to institute
suit within that time, constituted a ratification of the action
of its officers in disposing of the property. '6
The court's decision having been based solely upon Act 62
of 1912, the vital question raised is whether the language of this
act evidences the intent to apply the six-year peremption to pur-
ported alienations of the beds of navigable waters, or whether, in
view of the long enduring public policy of the state as to this type
of public property, such an intent should have been imputed to
the Legislature in the absence of a clear expression to that effect.
The pertinent portion of the statute provides:
"Section 1. Be it enacted ... that all suits or proceedings
of the State of Louisiana ... or persons to vacate and annul
any patent issued by the State of Louisiana, duly signed by
the Governor of the State and the Register of the State Land
Office and of record in the State Land Office, or any transfer
of property by any sub-division of the State, shall be brought
only within six years of the issuance of patent, provided,
that suits to annul patents previously issued shall be brought
within six years from the passage of this Act. ' 7
The court in the Humble Oil Company case applied the pro-
visions of this enactment to all patents or transfers, without
inquiry as to whether state officers were acting within their statu-
tory authority to alienate property in which the whole public
is interested, and permitted private parties to acquire indirectly
rights to certain public property which could not be acquired
directly for want of legislative authority to grant such rights.
5. 223 La. 47, 64 So. 2d 839, 841 (1953).
6. Ibid.
7. La. Act 62 of 1912, La. R.S. 1950, 9:5661.
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It would appear from the wording of the statute that it was
certainly intended to apply to patents issued pursuant to legis-
lative authority to alienate but lacking in some element of valid-
ity. But it is submitted that with reference to property an inten-
tion to alter the previous concepts concerning the nature of
navigable water bottoms should not be presumed in the absence
of an unequivocal legislative expression to that effect.
Since 1812 the beds of navigable waters have been regarded
as belonging peculiarly to the state.8 Originating from French
and Spanish sources, the same idea has been found, since 1808, in
the Civil Code's classification of public and private property
according to its susceptibility of private ownership.9 Article 449
establishes the three categories of things, or property: common,
public and private. Common things are described as those which
belong to nobody, Article 450; public things as those the property
of which is vested in a whole nation, Article 453; and private,
those things which belong to individuals, Article 459. The code
subdivides public things (property) according to susceptibility
of private ownership. 10 As to navigable waters, Article 453 states
that the property of navigable waters and their beds as long as
covered with water is "vested in a whole nation and the use of
which is allowed to all the members of the nation"; this corre-
sponds to the class of things insusceptible of private ownership
of Article 482, that is, those "of which all men have the enjoy-
ment and use."'
The elaborate classification system employed in the codal
articles relating to property has served as the basic framework
within which the Legislature and the judiciary have adjusted
8. The state, upon being admitted into the Union in 1812, acquired by
original title the beds and bottoms of all navigable lakes and streams within
its borders. Cf. cases cited in note 3 supra.
The Legislature has consistently adhered to that fundamental concept of
property law in both the codal and statutory provisions respecting public
lands and their alienation.
9. Articles cited herein refer to the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
10. Art. 458, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. It is to be noted that the word "common" as used in Article 450
designates those things which are absolutely insusceptible of any kind of
ownership, whereas "common" in Article 458 refers to things which "belong
in common" to citizens of a place. Things which are owned by the public
and are used in common by the public, are distinguished in Article 458
from those which though owned by the political unit are not used in
common. The classification of navigable rivers and beds of rivers, as public
things "as long as the same are covered with water" of Article 453 Is
logically in the first category of Article 458, i.e., the property of the beds
of such bodies of water is "vested in a whole nation and the use" is
allowed all its members.
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property relationships since the establishment of this state. It is
not a conclusive argument to point to the 1921 Constitution as
the beginning of the concept of inalienability of navigable water
bottoms. Whether the Legislature had the power to alienate the
beds of navigable waters prior to 1921 becomes a subordinate issue
when investigation reveals that the Legislature has consistently
and expressly excluded navigable water bottoms in general legis-
lation authorizing the disposition of public lands.1 2 At no time
has the Legislature affirmatively alienated or authorized the
alienation of beds of navigable waters. The judiciary has demon-
strated a corresponding awareness of the peculiar nature of
navigable water beds. The court announced its inalterable adher-
ence to the codal concept that beds of navigable waters are
insusceptible of private ownership in the celebrated Miami Cor-
poration v. State"3 decision. This landmark case culminated five
years' legal debate on the proposition of "insusceptibility" which
constituted the most thorough examination of the matter of
ownership of beds of navigable waters in the history of the state.
On the theory that a prior holding which permitted private
ownership of a lake bed 14 was "out-of-line with the Louisiana
jurisprudence on the subject of 'lakes'," the court sacrificed the
sanctity of private title, which had been acquired under patent
from the state, to the extent that such title purported to cover
land which had become a part of the bed of a navigable lake;
and it reversed a rule of property, asserting that such a reversal
was a lesser evil than perpetuation of the practice of permitting
private ownership of this species of property. The court repeated
its basis for arriving at the decision at numerous points in that
lengthy opinion. In essence it was:
"This is of necessity the law, because, to hold otherwise
would be contrary to sound principles and public policy upon
which the rule is predicated. It is the rule of property and
of title in this State, and also a rule of public policy that the
12. Acts purporting to authorize alienation of swamp, overflow and
seamarsh lands donated by Congress: La. Acts 75 of 1880, 195 of 1898, 125
of 1902. La. Act 188 of 1902 authorized the sale of other "lands acquired
from the United States." La. Act 55 of 1912 authorized the sale of lands
adjudicated to the state for unpaid taxes. La. Act 247 of 1855 authorized
sale of "swamp and overflow lands" and "non-navigable lakes after the same
were surveyed." (Italics supplied.) La. Act 185 of 1906 provided for approxi-
mately the same disposition as Act 124 of 1902.
13. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
14. State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
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State, as a sovereignty, holds title to the beds of navigable
bodies of water."15
"... public navigable bodies of water are insusceptible
of private ownership, being a public thing .... they belong
to the sovereign state. '16
The overriding consideration in the Miami Corporation case was
the long established rule of law based upon the insusceptibility
of private ownership doctrine.1 7 It should be noted that this con-
clusion was reached without reference to the 1921 constitutional
prohibition. Yet in the Humble Oil Company case that principle
of insusceptibility was not even acknowledged. In both the Miami
and Humble cases, the claims of private 'persons were the same
and the lakes in dispute were both navigable. However, in the
one case, the state was conceded to have patented the land to a
private individual. In the other, it is submitted that there was at
least a serious doubt as to whether the state conveyed title.
Although the court in Humble Oil Co. v. State Mineral Board
cited four cases, "an unbroken line of jurisprudence,"' 8 in support
of its conclusion, none of these was decisive of the matter pre-
sented in the instant suit. Not one purports to extend the legis-
lative intent of the 1912 act to cover unauthorized transfers of
beds of navigable waters. For example, in O'Brien v. State
Mineral Board,19 the court invoked the act but made no finding
with respect to the navigability of the lake bed in question.
Virtually the same treatment was made in the case of Realty
Operators v. State Mineral Board.2 0 The case of State v. Sweet
Lake Land and Oil Company21 is without application because the
court found as a fact that the water bottom in question was not
navigable. The Atchafalaya Land Co. v. F. B. Williams Cypress
Co. 22 case did not even involve a lake, navigable or otherwise.
15. 186 La. 784, 807, 173 So. 315, 322 (1936).
16. 186 La. 784, 816, 173 So. 315, 325.
17. After citing cases beginning with Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324
(1838), the court said:
"Now, there is no doubt that the foregoing authorities announce a rule of
law which has been in effect in this State since May, 1838." 186 La. 784,
812, 173 So. 315, 324.
18. Atchafalaya Land Co. v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 146 La. 1047,
84 So. 351 (1920), State v. Sweet Lake Land and Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113
So. 833 (1927); Realty Operators v. State Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d
198 (1942); O'Brien v. State Mineral Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So. 2d 470 (1945).
19. 209 La. 266, 24 So. 2d 470 (1945).
20. 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d 198 (1942).
21. 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927).
22. 146 La. 1047, 84 So. 351 (1920).
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In the future what disposition would the court make of a
dispute over the patent to a private person, issued prior to 1912,
wholly without statutory authorization, which purports to alien-
ate the bed of the Mississippi, the Red, the Atachafalaya, or some
other river or body of water which has always been navigable?
Though it was argued in the instant case that Act 97 of 1890
referred only to swamp lands and lands adjudicated to the state
for taxes, the court took no cognizance of its own or the Legis-
lature's long-standing policy in dealing with navigable water
beds. Instead the court stated that it is "a matter of no impor-
tance whether the deed of the public officers was beyond the
powers vested in them by Act 97 of 1890," 23 and "the bed of Duck
Lake was unquestionably embraced in the transfer of vacant
lands." (Italics supplied.)24 Is it conceivable that the Legisla-
ture could have intended two types of situations with respect to
ownership of navigable water bottoms to co-exist, that is, state
ownership under the "insusceptibility" doctrine, and private
ownership under Act 62 of 1912? The issues raised and passed
over in the Humble Oil Company case as non-essential could
provide a factual distinction supporting a decision compatible
with the state's established rule of property as regards beds of
navigable waters.2 5 In its earlier interpretation of the act con-
veying lands to the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, the court
was cognizant of the same principles adhered to in the Miami
Corporation case-beds of navigable waters are not governed
by the same rules as other public property. Of Act 87 of 1890,
the court said in State v. Capdeville,
"Even granting that it was the intention of the legislature
to grant to the levee board all lands however acquired (which
is quite doubtful, in view of the restrictive language as to
swamp lands and tax purchases or forfeitures) it can hardly
be said that this included land that was covered by navigable
waters such as the beds of the Mississippi, Red, and other
rivers."126
23. 223 La. 47, 64 So. 2d 839, 841 (1953).
24. Ibid.
25. The court did not construe La. Act 67 of 1890, but negatived inves-
tigation by stating the peremption statute of 1912 was applicable irrespec-
tive of the intent or effect of La. Act 67 of 1890.
26. 146 La. 94, 108, 83 So. 421 (1919). The court emphasized this point
further by stating: "This view is further emphasized by the very statute
(No. 124 of 1861-62) which the appellants cite In support of their contention
and In which the Legislature seems to have deemed it necessary to pro-
vide by legislative enactment that the beds of any and all lakes, subse-
quently becoming dry or land, should be swamp lands in order to impress
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In view of the court's repeated acknowledgment of the principle
of state ownership of beds and navigable waters in the Miami
Corporation decision, and further in view of the invocation of the
same principle in the above quotation with reference to the very
act under which the successful litigant in the Humble Oil Com-
pany case claimed title, it is surprising that the conclusion reached
in the instant case was so "perfectly apparent. '27 It is submitted,
therefore, that a re-examination of that conclusion is warranted
in future cases involving the question of private title to beds of
navigable waters.
Mary Ellen Caldwell
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-DUPLICITY
The defendant had committed two batteries in connection
with a single affray. He had been tried and convicted of one
of the batteries and entered a plea of former jeopardy when
brought to trial for the second. Held, the plea of former jeopardy
could not be maintained as the defendant had committed dis-
tinct batteries on two individuals. The batteries were separate
offenses regardless of the fact that they were closely connected
in point of time and were accomplished by defendant while
engaged in one unlawful transaction. State v. Ysasi, 222 La. 902,
64 So. 2d 213 (1953).
The Ysasi decision clearly enunciates the proposition that
two criminal offenses are not to be considered as one crime
because they result from a single unlawful transaction. The
majority of the common law authorities take the same position
and hold that if two or more persons are injured by several shots
or blows the offender may be prosecuted for each as a distinct
crime. Thus, where several shots are fired in rapid succession
killing more than one person, indictments will lie for each kill-
ing.1 The same rationale is applied in cases where the defendant
them with that character." See note 12 supra for other statutes purport-
ing to alienate beds of navigable waters after they become dry.
27. 223 La. 47, 64 So. 2d 839, 840 (1953).
1. State v. Taylor, 138 Kan. 407, 26 P. 2d 598 (1933); Slone v. Common-
wealth, 266 Ky. 366, 99 S.W. 2d 207 (1936); State v. Coolack, 17 N.J. Super.
192, 85 A. 2d 353 (1951); State v. Billot, 104 Ohio St. 13, 135 N.E. 285 (1922).
In State v. Singleton, 66 Ariz. 49, 182 P. 2d 920 (1947), the court stated: "As
to the contradiction that the defendant claims is Inherent in the verdicts,
we find it to be the settled majority rule of law that although several shots
1953]
